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Beyond Transparency: 
The Semantics of Rulemaking for an Open Internet 
 
REZA RAJABIUN* 
 
In trying to promote the development of an open Internet, the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has primarily tried to encourage network 
providers to be transparent about their traffic management practices and quality of 
service prioritization policies. Dominant network operators have successfully 
challenged this minimalist approach to addressing end-user concerns about the 
rise of a two-tiered Internet, motivating the FCC to engage in yet another public 
consultation process to assess its future approach to the problem. This article maps 
the debate using Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools that allow us to build a 
systematic picture of the positions of the regulator and groups of private interests 
trying to shape its decisions. A quantitative linguistic analysis of the content of 
formal written submissions to the FCC by parties with divergent views helps 
document how the conceptual model of the regulator evolved during the 
rulemaking process leading to the FCC February 2015 network neutrality Order. 
Despite the adoption of a broader substantive basis by the FCC under Title II of 
the Communications Act, the rule-of-reason approach to substantive interpretation 
in the Order limits the capacity of the new regulatory framework to protect and 
promote an open Internet. The evidence suggests the public consultation process is 
likely to serve as a tool for legitimizing status quo institutional arrangements that 
allow operators to engage in discriminatory traffic prioritization strategies.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2014 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit further limited 
the authority of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate 
discriminatory traffic management practices of broadband Internet providers by 
vacating key elements of the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order.1 Recognizing that 
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1 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), which vacated provisions against 
blocking and unreasonable discrimination of the FCC’s 2010 order in the matter of Preserving the 
Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 
(2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1_Rcd.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order]. In Verizon, the Court did uphold aspects of the 2010 
Open Internet Order with respect to transparency and disclosure of traffic management 
practices of operators. For recent overviews of business and legal conflicts and range of options 
1 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), which vacated provisions against 
blocking and unreasonable discrimination of the FCC’s 2010 order in the matter of Preserving the 
Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 
(2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1_Rcd.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order]. In Verizon, the Court did uphold aspects of the 2010 
Open Internet Order with respect to transparency and disclosure of traffic management 
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the Internet’s open architecture is critical for the capacity of “innovators and 
consumers at the edges of the network ‘to create and determine the success or 
failure of content, applications, services and devices,’” in May 2014 the 
Commission issued the FCC 14-61 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
asking “what is the right public policy to ensure that the Internet remains open?” 
and soliciting comments from the public about options for moving forward.2 In 
response consumers and other stakeholders submitted around four million 
comments to the FCC.3 The high degree of public interest in the matter also led to 
growing calls by the executive and legislative branches on an ostensibly 
independent regulator to take action, one way or another.4 In February 2015 the 
FCC adopted an Order on remand, strengthening the substantive basis it has to act 
against practices such as blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization that it 
determined threaten the open Internet.5 Although little time has passed since the 
publication of the FCC Order, legal and legislative challenges to the regulatory 
compromise it constitutes are already underway.6  
At least in part, the fact that narrow technical issues relating to traffic 
                                                                                                             
practices of operators. For recent overviews of business and legal conflicts and range of options 
for promoting neutrality, see Tejas Narechania, Network Nepotism and the Market for Content 
Delivery, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 27 (2014). Barbara Van Schewick, Network Neutrality and 
Quality of Service: What a Non-Discrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2015). For a discussion of technical and business aspects of discrimination and the potential 
desirability of its regulation, see KC Claffy & David D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable 
Internet Regulation, 4 J. INFO. POL’Y 463 (2014).  
2 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 14-61 (2014)  
[hereinafter FCC 14-61 Notice]. 
3 Gigi B. Sohn, FCC Releases Open Internet Reply Comments to the Public, OFFICIAL 
FCC BLOG (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/fcc-releases-open-internet-reply-
comments-public. 
4 For example, see the statement by President Obama urging the FCC to create a new set 
of rules that comply with the decision by the Court of Appeals in Verizon by reclassifying 
“consumer broadband service under Title II of the Telecommunications Act—while at the 
same time forbearing from rate regulation and other provisions less relevant to broadband 
services. This is a basic acknowledgment of the services ISPs provide to American homes 
and businesses, and the straightforward obligations necessary to ensure the network works 
for everyone—not just one or two companies.” See The White House, Net Neutrality: 
President Obama’s Plan For a Free and Open Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-
neutrality. In response, Senator Ted Cruz called network neutrality “Obamacare for the 
Internet” and Republican leadership in Congress tried to block Title II reclassification. See 
Colin Campbell, Ted Cruz Says Network Neutrality is”Obamacare for the Internet”, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/ted-cruz-net-neutrality-is-
obamacare-for-the-internet-2014-11. Tony Romm, Net Neutrality to Dominate D.C.’s Tech 
Agenda, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:35 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/fcc-
open-internet-rules-republicans-113774.html#ixzz3NJSkK2kA.  
5 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, 
FCC 15-24 (2015), Chairman Wheeler and Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel 
issuing separate statements; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting and issuing separate 
statements. 
6 See, e.g., Protective Petition to Review filed by United States Telecom Association with 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, March 23, 2015. Case No. 15-1063. Reports suggest 
that some members of both parties in Congress are dissatisfied with the FCC’s decision, but 
for different reasons. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Potential for a Bipartisan Bill on Network 
Neutrality Emerges in Congress, LA TIMES (March 25, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-net-neutrality-legislation-20150325-story.html. 
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prioritization by network operators have become the source of broad public 
concern reflects increasing use of fixed and wireless broadband infrastructure by 
businesses, households, and individuals. What is particularly interesting about this 
debate is that politicians, operators, and end user groups all appear to agree that 
having an open Internet is a desirable objective for promoting access and 
innovation. However, they also tend to have contradictory perspectives on what 
policy strategies are likely to help protect or promote the Internet’s purported 
openness. Understanding how the stakeholders conceptualize legal and economic 
aspects of the problem, as well as its potential remedies, represents a first step in 
reconciling opposing private interests into efficiency-enhancing regulations that 
may ultimately serve the public interest mandate of the agencies such as the FCC.7 
This Article examines conceptual models of the problems embedded in the 
semantics of participants in the rulemaking process. These participants include 
operators that have successfully employed the courts to limit the authority of the FCC 
to regulate their traffic management practices and prefer status quo institutional 
arrangements to continue, and other groups trying to convince policymakers to adopt 
binding legal constraints against discriminatory traffic management practices by the 
operators. Further, this Article examines the FCC’s position as stated in the 2014 
Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the resulting 2015 FCC Order. 
Using quantitative content analysis software, the Article maps concepts and themes 
emphasized by the courts, the FCC, and subgroups of interveners in their formal 
submissions to the consultation process.8 The Article elaborates on a preliminary 
study of stakeholder feedback submitted to the FCC on this matter. 9  
Section I provides an overview of the debate by extracting and mapping the text 
of the FCC’s 2014 Notice as well as key judicial decisions over the past decade that 
set the stage for the ongoing debates. Section II compares the variety and intensity 
of concepts emphasized in formal written submissions by a sample of stakeholders 
with contradictory interests and positions about what the FCC should do to serve 
the public interest. Section III provides an overview of the content of the FCC 
Order. To provide a more concrete picture of the evolution of the debate, Section 
IV analyzes quantitative indicators of semantic emphasis by the regulator and 
divergent groups that tried to influence its decision. Finally, Section V summarizes 
the analysis and draws inferences from the evidence about the likely impact of the 
regulatory framework that emerged from this public consultation process.  
 
                                                                                                             
 
7 See James Buchanan, & Dwight Lee. Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing 
Antitrust Policies, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 2, 218–24 (1992). 
8 For an overview of developments and limitations of NLP technologies, see HANDBOOK 
OF NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (Nitin Indurkhya & Fred Damerau eds., 2nd ed. 2010). 
There is a variety of open-source and commercial software available for extracting and 
analyzing unstructured human language (text and voice), a review of which is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For recent examples of the application of content analysis to Internet 
governance and broadband regulation, see Dmitry Epstein, Merrill C. Roth, & Eric Baumer, 
It’s the Definition, Stupid! Framing of Online Privacy in the Internet Governance Forum 
Debates, 4 J. INFO. POL’Y 144 (2014); Reza Rajabiun & Catherine Middleton, Public Interest 
in the Regulation of Competition: Evidence from Wholesale Internet Access Consultations in 
Canada, 5 J. INFO. POL’Y  32 (2015).  
9 See Reza Rajabiun, Content Mapping of the FCC 14-61 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and Formal Submissions by Stakeholders Using Natural Language Processing (NLP), 
(2014) http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=6019160552.  
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I. OVERVIEW: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND POLITICAL SIGNALS 
 
While the decision in Verizon v. FCC has restricted the ancillary authority of the 
FCC to compel broadband operators not to adopt discriminatory traffic 
management practices, the D.C. Circuit Court highlighted that if it so chooses, the 
FCC could redefine broadband providers as common carriers under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934.10 Such a designation would then provide the FCC 
with a broad statutory basis to adopt and enforce rules that it finds appropriate for 
addressing practices by operators that it determines to be against the public 
interest.11 The mere suggestion in the FCC 14-61 Notice that the agency might be 
willing to consider reclassifying broadband access services under Title II generated 
significant political debate. For example, in a letter by the House Republican 
leadership to the FCC, the lawmakers urged the Commission “to halt” its 
“consideration of any plan to impose antiquated regulation on the Internet because 
Title II designation and network neutrality obligations would reduce investment 
incentives of broadband operators and not be in the interests of consumers.”12 In 
contrast, a coalition of Democratic Senators expressed concern about the FCC’s 
commitment to network neutrality regulation in an environment where the 
“potential to profit from monopolistic, anticompetitive, anti-innovation, and anti-
consumer practices has grown.”13  
The apparent divide among lawmakers captures the main contours of the debate 
surrounding network neutrality. Proponents of the status quo regime—where the 
FCC has little legal authority to force operators to stop or amend discriminatory 
practices that it finds objectionable—tend to suggest the best way for maintaining 
an open Internet and investment in broadband networks is to continue to forebear 
from restricting the boundary of permissible conduct of the operators. To 
proponents of Title II authority and the adoption of legally binding rules against 
anticompetitive discrimination or blocking, reforms are necessary because such 
practices are adverse to consumers’ interests and will reduce the capacity of the 
open Internet to serve as an innovation-generating platform.  
                                                                                                             
 
10 Or potentially under Section 706(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (47 U.S.C. § 
1302), which provides the FCC and state commissions with some discretionary authority to 
adopt policies that “remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” However, Section 706(b) 
stipulates that in order to rely on this authority the Commission must first “determine 
whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a 
reasonable and timely fashion.” This statutory language sets a high burden of the proof for 
the Commission if it tries to avoid Title II reclassification and instead attempts to impose 
rules on the operators based on Section 706(a) authority. For a detailed assessment of legal 
strategies facing the FCC, see Tejas N. Narechania & Tim Wu, Sender Side Transmission 
Rules for the Internet, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 467 (2014).  
11 An analysis of the range of legal and technical options for mitigating this problem is 
beyond the scope of this article; for detailed discussions, see Van Schewick, supra note 1. 
Narechania & Wu, supra note 10; Jan Krämer, Lukas Wiewiorra & Christof Weinhardt, Net 
Neutrality: A Progress Report, 37 TELECOMM. POL’Y 794 (2013). 
12 See Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House, et al. to the FCC (May 14, 2014), 
available at http://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/5-14-14-Net-Neutrality-
Letter.pdf. 
13 See Letter from Ron Wyden, Oregon Senator, et al. to the FCC (May 9, 2014), 
available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=54fa5f99-47c8-47be-93c1-
46374e531e1a&download=1. 
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Short letters by lawmakers signaling their positions are relatively easy to read 
and interpret by humans. As the size and complexity of relevant communications 
increases, it becomes more difficult to compare and contrast conceptual models and 
positions embedded in them, a problem that automated content extraction and 
analytics technologies can help address. Importantly in the context of this article, 
the short letters by lawmakers outlining their positions on the legal treatment of 
network operators also highlight a key problem in moving from manual reading to 
machine learning in an attempt to “understand” subtle legal and policy arguments.  
Namely in political discourse, entities with opposing interests and views often tend 
to emphasize very similar concepts for conveying their message, presumably 
because they suspect that certain concepts are more effective in convincing their 
audience to accept their position.  
In the case of debates about the regulatory framework for prioritizing Internet 
traffic when demand for scarce network resources is high, promoting consumer 
interests, innovation, and an open Internet represent common objectives for groups 
with divergent perspectives on how these objectives should be achieved. Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) and textual analytics technologies available today can 
help extract and map the content of such documents, but are not yet sufficiently 
advanced to extract the “sentiments” among relevant concepts very well.14 Instead of 
looking for sentiments among concepts, this article explores what different groups of 
interveners in consultation process are trying to add to the debate by analyzing the 
variety and intensity of concepts they emphasize in their formal submissions to the 
FCC. To evaluate how these perspectives were mapped into a notion of public 
interest regulations by the FCC, we then compare quantitative indicators of semantics 
in the submissions and the FCC Notice with those extracted from the text of the 2015 
FCC Order on remand. The methodology allows for a systematic mapping of the 
emergence of a public interest regulatory bargain shaped by private interests, which is 
likely to remain at the center of legal and policy conflicts about the operation of 
Internet access infrastructure in the U.S. for a long time.  
High-level themes in the debate illustrated in the letters to the FCC by opposing 
groups of lawmakers provide a first view of core issues at hand, about which the 
Commission had to come to a decision one way or the other: (1) maintain the status 
quo where it has little power to compel operators to alter aspects of their 
management practices that appear anticompetitive and/or are not in the interest of 
the consumers; or (2) invoke its Title II authority and prohibit more objectionable 
business practices of broadband service providers in a manner that is more likely to 
withstand future judicial scrutiny. In a three-to-two vote divided along partisan 
lines, the FCC Order on remand followed the judicial guidance in Verizon by 
reclassifying broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service subject to 
regulation under the broader substantive authority provided under Title II.15  
While this high-level decision about the substantive basis for regulation may 
appear to have enhanced the prospects for the emergence of binding legal constraints 
against practices that threaten an open Internet, the FCC Order exempts practices that 
can be argued to be “reasonable” and those relating to “specialized services.” The 
FCC’s specialized services exemption and the rule-of-reason approach (versus per se 
rules) to substantive interpretation limit the credibility of the regulatory framework as 
a constraint on discriminatory traffic management practices and service quality 
                                                                                                             
 
14 See HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING, supra note 8. 
15 See FCC 15-24, supra n. 5. 
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differentiation. The rest of this article employs NLP and quantitative content analysis 
software to decompose and analyze these high-level legal and policy issues into 
lower-level concepts emphasized by the FCC, the courts, and interest groups that 
tried to influence the outcome of this rulemaking process.  
 
A. Content Map of the FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 
To understand what the stakeholders were trying to convey in their comments to 
the FCC, our approach is to compare the concepts they emphasize with that of a 
relevant analytical benchmark. The logical first choice for a benchmark in this case 
is the text of FCC 14-61 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the written statement of 
the regulators’ perspective on the problem at the start of the public consultations. 
The text of the FCC Notice is approximately 100 pages long and includes 
references to legal, procedural, and policy considerations in the design of 
regulations for protecting and promoting an open Internet. A two-stage process is 
employed to analyze the content of the Notice as well as corpuses of past legal 
decisions and stakeholder comments to this proceeding:16  
Quantitative analysis: First we extract the text of the document and generate 
quantitative indicators of frequencies by which the words co-occur. This allows us 
to identify “concepts” as words that tend to appear relatively more frequently in the 
context of other words in the corpus.17  
Relational analysis: In the second stage we explore underlying relationships 
among concepts discovered based on quantitative indicators of their relevance in 
the first stage, using iterative clustering algorithms designed for identifying 
groupings of concepts (i.e. themes) based on their co-occurrence frequencies and 
mapping connections among them.18  
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the FCC Notice’s content, as well as how 
some of the key concepts are connected to each other.19 The Appendix also presents a 
comprehensive list of emergent concepts extracted from the FCC Notice, written 
submissions by opposing interests, and the subsequent FCC Order.  
 
                                                                                                             
 
16 There are a variety of commercial and open source software packages available that 
can be employed for the type of analysis that follows, a review of which is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Here, we use the general-purpose textual analysis platform from Leximancer. 
17 That is, in their “context,” not simple keywords. 
18 For details of the underlying methodology, see Andrew E. Smith & Michael S. 
Humphreys, Evaluation of Unsupervised Semantic Mapping of Natural Language with 
Leximancer Concept Mapping, 38 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 262 (2006). 
19 This and other figures are “heat mapped,” with the most relevant concept clusters 
appearing in red, then orange, yellow, blue, green, and so on. The proximity and links 
among individual concepts in the figure are determined using a stochastic clustering model 
for exploring interconnectedness of semantic elements in the text that tend to co-occur. For 
statistical indicators of the relevance of concepts in the Notice, please see the Appendix. In 
the discussion that follows, “concepts” are defined quantitatively as the most frequent word 
in collections of words that travel together in the text (i.e. in context; not simple keywords in 
the usual sense or as represented in traditional word clouds). Themes are higher-level 
groupings of concepts that tend to travel together, defined or named as the most frequent 
concept in a concept cluster. For further details on underlying methodology see id.  
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Figure 1. Content Map of The FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 
This visual summary provides an overview of core issues in the debate and 
illustrates the value of quantitative content analysis for simplifying complex 
documents into their central elements with little human supervision: Starting from 
the left side of the picture, the relevance of the challenge posed by the Verizon 
decision to the authority of the Commission (which has prompted this FCC 
process) are highlighted. At the core of the ideas presented in the Notice (in red) 
are the more overarching questions about the boundary of commercially reasonable 
traffic management practices by broadband providers. Economic considerations 
such as innovation, investment, and competition in the market for content (in 
orange on the right side) are also prominent and tend to co-occur relatively 
frequently. The legal issue of Title II authority is closely associated with the 
concept of transparency, indicative of the emphasis of the agency on improving the 
transparency of traffic management practices of operators. At the top of the figure, 
the content map captures conflicts associated with growing demand for video 
content via the Internet and the treatment of third-party content and applications by 
cable broadband operators.  
 
B. Legal Direction and Context 
 
Attempts by the FCC to compel dominant operators to adjust some of their more 
problematic traffic management, throttling, and blocking policies and/or to disclose 
such policies to their customers have faced significant resistance by the operators 
and the judiciary. To better understand the legal context that guides and motivated 
this rulemaking process, we select the text of three prominent decisions by the 
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judiciary on the scope of FCC’s authority to regulate the market for Internet access 
services—appellate decisions in Verizon v. FCC20 and Comcast Corp. v. FCC21 and 
the Supreme Court decision in NCTA v. Brand X.22 We employ semantic mapping 
techniques that allow us to evaluate concepts emphasized in particular text 
corpuses relative to each other. Figure 2 summarizes the content of the FCC Notice 
in relation to the three key legal decisions that constrain the agency’s statutory 
authority. The file names on the visualizations are situated closer to concepts that 
are relatively more prominent in them.  
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of Legal Concepts Guiding FCC 14-61 
 
This visual depiction can be interpreted in chronological terms as a measure of 
how key aspects of the debate have evolved over time (by moving from left to 
right). Over the past decade the courts have emphasized limitations to FCC’s 
authority to regulate business conduct of broadband carriers, an issue that remains 
central to the appellate decision in Verizon v. FCC and the need to invoke Title II 
authority. Both the Verizon decision and the FCC Notice differ from earlier judicial 
decisions in terms of their semantic emphasis as they appear to pay relatively more 
attention to economic and technological aspects of discriminatory traffic 
management practices by dominant network operators (e.g., concepts in lower right 
hand of the map—market, investment, innovation, consumers, traffic, content, 
video). The FCC Notice extended the debate by asking if these considerations 
warrant adopting standards for network management practice on the edge of fixed 
and mobile networks.  
 
                                                                                                             
 
20  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
21 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
22 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002–03 
(2005). 
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II. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY SUBMISSIONS 
 
The FCC 14-61 Notice allowed the public to submit relatively short comments 
(a few paragraphs), as well as more substantive formal interventions via the usual 
procedural mechanisms the agency employs in its rulemaking processes. Although 
it is not clear if and how the FCC managed to “review” every comment that it has 
received as it had promised, some preliminary assessments of the shorter comments 
using NLP techniques have appeared in the media.23 These reports suggest that a 
large proportion of the short-form comments were duplicates based on standardized 
templates,24 such as those that might be submitted via a public petition or variants 
of the same template sent by a spam robot working for a particular interest. 
Furthermore, previous assessments indicated the vast majority of the content of 
short-form submissions to the FCC was comprised of pro-neutrality concepts and 
themes; indeed it appears to be very difficult to detect anti-neutrality keywords and 
concepts.25 These results are consistent with the hypothesis noted above in the 
context of short letters from lawmakers to the regulator: Everybody appears to 
agree that having an open Internet is the ultimate policy objective, but there are 
competing perspectives on the type of rules and institutions that are required for 
achieving this objective. 
Instead of focusing on short-form comments, this Article analyzes the content of 
a sample of around fifteen relatively substantive formal comments (more than a 
few pages). Formal comments included in our sample are selected in order to 
reflect a diversity of interests and positions about what the FCC should do to serve 
the public interest, including submissions from dominant operators, Internet 
content and technology companies, consumer and business advocacy groups, 
investors in new media industries, and representatives of people with disabilities 
and ethnic minority groups.26 Consequently, the objective here is not to generalize 
from the sample to the population, which would require random stratification of the 
comments. Instead the stratified, purposeful sampling of the submissions adopted 
here is intended to highlight the variety of concepts and differences in semantic 
emphasis by organizations with distinct economic interests and positions in this 
matter.27  
Figure 3 provides a visual summary of stakeholder feedback to the FCC from 
the corpus of all formal submissions in our sample. The range of concepts that 
emerge from the corpus of stakeholder submissions appears to be broader than that 
of the FCC Notice discussed above. This difference is not surprising since the 
corpus of the submissions is much longer than the FCC Notice and our sample is 
drawn from a wide variety of interested parties who are likely to emphasize aspects 
of the problem that are more important to their interests. Nevertheless, the basic 
visual representations of concepts in the FCC Notice in Figure 1 and the corpus of 
                                                                                                             
 
23 See Elise Hu, A Fascinating Look Inside Those 1.1 Million Open-Internet Comments, 
NPR (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/08/12/339710293/a-
fascinating-look-inside-those-1-1-million-open-internet-comments.  
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 A list of organizations and abbreviations of their names used in the visualizations is 
provided in Table 3 of the Appendix. 
27 See DONNA M. MERTENS & AMY T. WILSON, PROGRAM EVALUATION THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 418–25 (2012). 
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comments in Figure 3 appear to centralize very similar clusters of concepts and 
themes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Content Map of Stakeholder’s Formal Submissions to FCC 14-61 
 
Moving from left to right of the figure, we observe the importance of questions 
about congestion, traffic management practices, and conflicts among vertically 
integrated cable operators and Internet content providers (e.g., Comcast versus 
Netflix). Concept clusters associated with conflicts over terms and quality of 
interconnection (in blue clusters), as well as the relevance of neutrality for video 
and advanced applications are also apparent (in green clusters). According to this 
analysis, the core question (in red) raised by the stakeholders is access to content 
on the edge of the broadband ecosystem. The authority of the FCC to regulate paid 
prioritization (in orange) and the potential for Title II reclassification (yellow) also 
emerge as prominent themes in the corpus of submissions. 
In addition to decomposing the submission into their technological, economic, 
and legal elements, the linkages among the concepts depicted in Figure 3 are 
instructive and further illustrate the capacity of the underlying NLP techniques to 
generate intuitive insights in a relatively autonomous manner. Again moving from 
left to right, observe how the connections move from very specific concepts that 
capture business and economic conflicts motivating this proceeding (such as 
Comcast, Netflix, video, and congestion), to more general concepts at the center of 
the regulatory debate, including traffic management practices of broadband 
operators and their implications for the ability of end users to access Internet 
content and application services. Analogously, moving from right to left, linkages 
among the core legal issues relating to Title II reclassification, openness of the 
Internet, and the public demand on the FCC to “ensure” “neutrality” in “access” to 
the “Internet” are apparent (on the edge of red and yellow clusters). 
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Figure 4. High-Level Themes in Comments to the FCC 
 
Figure 4 offers a complementary depiction of the same corpus of submissions 
by aggregating lower level concepts identified in Figure 3 into four larger clusters 
of main themes. Furthermore, Figure 4 documents the links between the core legal 
problem of Title II authority and other relatively overarching concepts extracted 
from the submissions. Moving from left to right, the visualization captures the 
growing use of wireless devices. The top left hand cluster documents concepts 
associated with implications of this process for market competition, innovation, and 
investment. Rapidly growing demand for network resources associated with the 
popularity of third-party Internet content services, and the well known example of 
traffic management practices of Comcast with respect to Netflix traffic, also 
emerge as concepts closely associated with the idea of Title II reclassification (in 
the lower left hand cluster). The core theme (in red) at the center of Figure 4 
focuses on the implications of traffic management practices of broadband operators 
on consumers and edge/content network providers.28 The right hand cluster 
illustrates the central legal dilemma that faced the FCC in the process regarding 
Title II reclassification of broadband Internet access services.  
 
III. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE FCC ORDER 
 
The decision by FCC to invoke Title II authority has already been the subject of 
significant criticisms for a variety of reasons noted by the two Commissioners who 
                                                                                                             
 
28 Such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) operated by large and resourceful entities 
like Google, Amazon, and Akamai. 
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opposed its adoption in the Order.29 Beyond this headline decision to recognize 
broadband Internet as a telecommunications platform (versus information service), 
the Commission also reiterated its commitment to enhanced transparency and 
binding legal rules for defining the boundary of permissible conduct by operators 
(e.g., blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization). Figure 5 provides a visual 
summary of key concepts emphasized in the FCC Order, a document that is about 
400 pages long and includes detailed discussions of various legal and policy 
aspects of the revised regulatory framework.  
 
 
Figure 5. Content Map of 2015 FCC Open Internet Order 
 
Moving from left to right of the Figure 5, the FCC emphasizes the statutory 
basis that Congress grants the agency in the Communications Act and the input 
from the proceedings (in light blue) to justify a change in the definition of 
broadband access from an information service (in red). Judicial guidance in Verizon 
limiting the substantive basis available to the FCC for imposing binding legal 
obligations on operators engaged in undesirable conduct (in dark blue) is closely 
connected with the decision to reclassify broadband access (in red). Traffic 
management practices such as blocking and paid prioritization (in yellow), as well 
as the need to apply the rules to mobile Internet access, are documented in the 
upper right of the figure. The Order places significant emphasis on the concept of 
“free expression,” linking it closely to economic ideas such as “competition” and 
                                                                                                             
 
29 See FCC 14-61 Notice (Pai, dissenting, available at https://www.fcc.gov/article/doc-
332260a5; O’Rielly, dissenting, available at https://www.fcc.gov/article/doc-332260a6).  
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“investment” in explaining why its approach to the problem is in the public interest 
(on the edge of red, orange, and green clusters at the center).  
 
IV. COMPARATIVE SEMANTICS: STAKEHOLDERS VERSUS THE FCC 
 
Visualizations of core concepts and themes extracted from written statements by 
the courts, the regulator, and interveners offer a general picture of technological 
drivers, legal options, and economic implications of discriminatory traffic 
management practices. To provide a more concrete assessment of the evolution of 
the debate during the most recent public consultation process, the rest of this 
Article moves away from visual presentations of the results and focuses on 
quantitative differences in the variety and intensity of concepts emphasized by the 
regulators and two subgroups of stakeholders that tried to shape the FCC’s 
decisions in this matter. We separate our sample of formal submissions to the FCC 
into two parts, one consisting of the operators and the second of everybody else, 
including a wide array of consumer groups, content and application providers, 
investors in emerging content and application services, and other advocacy 
organizations (hereinafter, “the others”).30  
Quantitative measures of the relevance of particular concepts in the FCC Notice 
and from the two groups of stakeholders provide a basis for characterizing the 
emergence of the regulatory bargain by the Commission in the Order that tries to 
balance competing private interests and translate them into public interest 
regulations. The “relevance” metric discussed below represents an index31 of the 
proportion of context blocks32 which are related to particular concepts, relative to 
the most frequent concept.33  
There are a number of emerging concepts across the four corpuses that are 
relatively common, including name-like concepts (proper names with capital first 
letters) such as the names of dominant operators in the market, the FCC, the 
Internet, Netflix, and the Commission.34 Word-like concepts that are relatively 
common across the texts include those such as broadband, providers, access, and 
services. Table 1 presents indicators of semantic emphasis placed on name-like 
technological and legal concepts at the center of this proceeding: Openness of the 
“Internet” and the reclassification of broadband access networks under “Title II” 
authority.  
  
                                                                                                             
 
30 See Appendix for details. The methodology adopted here can be employed in the 
future to explore more variations within these groups based on a larger sample of formal 
submissions and short form comments.  
31 Between 0 and 1 (multiply by 100 for percentage coverage in the corpus).  
32 Defined here as two sentence blocks. 
33 The most overarching concept is set to 1, or 100%, and the relevance of all other 
concepts is below this maximum. Consequently, the relevance metric is a normalized index 
of semantic intensity of particular concepts that is comparable across corpuses of varying 
size. 
34 Or variants of these words. We generally combine very similar words and concepts in 
the analysis with a word-stemming algorithm that tries to merge word variants, although this 
approach is not perfect. 
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Table 1. Relevance of Key Legal and Technological Concepts 
 
	   FCC	  Notice	   Providers	   Others	   FCC	  Order	  
Internet	   51%	   77%	   100%	   65%	  
Title	  II	   4%	   17%	   22%	   7%	  
  
The Internet represents a concept with a relatively wide coverage in the stated 
positions from all parties. However, it emerges as the most relevant concept in 
submissions by parties that urged the FCC to adopt a more active role in protecting 
and promoting an open Internet.35 Similarly, Title II authority represents a relatively 
more important concept in submissions by the pro-neutrality group than either the 
FCC Notice or the operators. Notably, the magnitude of emphasis on Title II 
authority in the submissions from both operators and the other interveners was 
substantially larger than the FCC Notice (between four and five times larger). 
Although there might be other reasons for this observation, interests with opposing 
views on the matter devoted substantially more attention to explaining their 
contradictory positions about Title II reclassification than the agency did in its Notice 
to initiate this proceeding. The relatively lower emphasis in the FCC Notice on Title 
II might reflect an attempt to avoid this difficult issue. This interpretation of the 
semantic data seems consistent with the FCC’s stated position in the Notice.36  
As the ultimate decision by the FCC to adopt Title II authority suggests, the 
agency was not able to achieve this objective. Although indicators of conceptual 
emphasis do not allow us to predict the FCC’s ultimate decision about adopting 
Title II authority and the parties’ sentiment towards the issue, it is evident that Title 
II authority is a substantially more integral part of the final Order than of the initial 
Notice. The relatively higher emphasis that stakeholders placed on the importance 
of this core legal issue appears to have made it harder for the agency to avoid the 
challenge presented to it by the courts in Verizon. 
For interested readers, Table 2 in the Appendix provides a comprehensive list of 
word-like concepts extracted from the four corpuses. Below we summarize a few 
notable results that document some of the primary signals that conflicting private 
interests conveyed to the FCC in their submissions and how the Commission 
mapped private interest semantics into a regulatory bargain intended to serve the 
public interests: 37  
                                                                                                             
 
35 The term “broadband” is the most relevant concept in the FCC Notice and submissions 
by operators. See below for further discussion of the potential relevance of emphasis on 
“broadband” versus the “Internet.” 
36 See supra note 2, para. 4:  
The goal of this proceeding is to find the best approach to protecting and 
promoting Internet openness. Per the blueprint offered by the D.C. Circuit 
in its decision in Verizon v. FCC, the Commission proposes to rely on 
section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. At the same time, the 
Commission will seriously consider the use of Title II of the 
Communications Act as the basis for legal authority … the Commission 
seeks comment on the best ways to define, prevent and punish the practices 
that threaten an open Internet. 
37 Concepts discussed here are highlighted in bold format in Table 2 of the Appendix. 
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Central problem: The most overarching concepts emphasized by the FCC, 
operators, and the others tend to be very similar and include ideas such as 
broadband, providers, services, access, and rules.38  
Semantic divergence: Once we move beyond the first five to ten more 
overarching concepts on top of the lists in Table 2, the language of the parties 
begins to diverge both in terms of the concepts they are employing to characterize 
the problem and emphasis placed on common concepts as measured by their 
relevance metric. 
General vs. specific framing of the subject matter: The terms broadband and 
providers represent the most relevant concepts in the FCC Notice and submissions 
by the operators, while the Internet emerges as the most connected concept in the 
comments by the others. This difference indicates that the entities seeking an 
enhanced role for the FCC to regulate potentially discriminatory practices placed a 
relatively higher emphasis on broader implications of broadband providers’ traffic 
management practices for the operation of the Internet. Given that broadband is 
only a platform for accessing all the wonders of the Internet, this broader framing 
by the pro-neutrality group stands in contrast to the narrower, more technical 
concept of broadband centralized in the texts of the FCC Notice and submissions 
by the operators. This can be interpreted as a signal to the FCC to look beyond 
sector-specific considerations and enhance the regulators’ awareness about more 
general implications of its broadband infrastructure related decisions for the 
Internet as a whole. The text of the FCC Order places substantially more emphasis 
on the general idea of the Internet than the initial Notice, indicating that the public 
proceedings may have helped the Commission better evaluate the implications of 
its decision about broadband regulation for the ability of consumers to access the 
Internet.  
Openness and neutrality: The concept “open” appears relatively frequently in 
all four corpuses, indicative of the fact that everybody appears to agree that having 
an open Internet is a worthy objective. However, the emphasis placed on the 
concept by the FCC and in the submissions by the operators is substantially lower 
than the pro-neutrality subsample (between two and three times lower). Differences 
in semantic emphasis with respect to this common concept are particularly 
informative as they illustrate the opposing directions in which the two groups of 
submissions are trying to push the FCC. Between the FCC Notice and final Order, 
the relevance of openness actually declined. Not surprisingly, the idea of neutrality 
arises relatively frequently in the submissions by the non-operator/pro-neutrality 
group and much less so in the case of operators. It is notable that the FCC appears 
to avoid using this term, indicative of a potentially wide gap between the regulator 
and interveners that tried to convince it to adopt rules that promote Internet 
openness and neutrality. The semantic evidence indicates the proceedings were not 
necessarily about imposing rules that support network neutrality, but more an 
attempt to legalize service quality differentiation policies that are already relatively 
commonplace in fixed and mobile broadband network management (i.e. bifurcation 
of the Internet into fast and slow lanes).39  
                                                                                                             
 
38 Similarities of most relevant concepts extracted from the corpuses illustrate the 
capacity of quantitative NLP techniques employed here to summarize core issues in large 
and complex bodies of textual evidence in a relatively automated and consistent manner.  
39 A wide range of internal and third party technologies are deployed by operators that 
allow them to differentiate service quality based on criteria they find profitable. See, e.g., 
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Beyond transparency: FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order did not include very 
strong prohibitions against discriminatory traffic management practices and instead 
had tried to encourage providers to disclose their policies to their customers.40 The 
need to enhance transparency continued to appear as a relatively prominent concept 
in framing the problem in the FCC Notice, which suggests some continuity in 
FCC’s intended approach to the problem. In contrast to the FCC Notice, 
transparency does not emerge as a relevant concept in the submissions by either 
group of stakeholders or in the FCC Order. While the Order “reaffirms the 
importance of ensuring transparency” and adopts certain enhanced disclosure 
requirements on operators,41 the FCC’s declining emphasis on the idea suggests a 
growing recognition by the policymakers that simply promoting market 
transparency may not be sufficient to constrain the type of anticompetitive traffic 
management practices raising concern. The decision by the Commission to adopt 
Title II as a substantive basis can enhance the ability of the agency to impose 
stronger requirements on operators to disclose their traffic management practices in 
retail contracts with end users. 
Scope of the rules: In its previous attempts to legally constrain operators from 
engaging in certain traffic management practices, the FCC had focused the scope of 
its efforts on fixed broadband networks. In the Order that resulted from this 
proceeding the Commission also included mobile services in the regulatory 
framework. While the FCC Notice and submissions by the operators placed 
relatively little emphasis on mobile connectivity, discriminatory traffic 
management practices by mobile operators were a prominent theme in the 
submissions by the others. The FCC Order places a substantially higher emphasis 
on mobile connectivity than the Notice, indicating that stakeholder submissions 
may have helped the regulator better understand the growing importance of mobile 
Internet services to consumers and to broaden the scope of regulatory obligations it 
plans to implement.42  
Design of the rules: At least since the early 1970s, U.S. Courts have become 
inhospitable to imposing per se prohibitions on discriminatory market behavior 
exercised by dominant operators,43 a perspective reiterated in the Verizon decision 
with respect to the future design of open Internet regulations. The FCC Notice 
placed significant emphasis on the “commercially” “reasonable” nature of network 
management practices at the center of the debate. In contrast, those seeking the 
adoption of bidding rules highlighted the impact of “blocking” and 
“discrimination” for the ability of “consumers” to deploy “content” and 
                                                                                                             
products from Sandvine or AT&T Mobility’s patented approach to “Prevention of 
Bandwidth Abuse of a Communications System” (U.S. Patent No. 20140010082 A1 (filed 
Sept. 12, 2013)). 
40 In addition to enhancing transparency in retail contracts, the 2010 Order prohibited 
blocking and unreasonable discrimination to protect Internet access. Verizon v. FCC, 740 
F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (showing that these prohibitions were struck down).  
41 Supra note 5, para. 24.  
42 While the Order extends the obligations to mobile operators, it “expressly recognizes 
that evaluation of network management practices will take into account the additional 
challenges involved in the management of mobile networks, including the dynamic 
conditions under which they operate.” See supra note 5, para. 34.  
43 For a historical analysis of increasing aversion by the courts to per se rules and the 
transition to the rule-of-reason approach to substantive interpretation in antitrust 
enforcement, see Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the 
Evolution of Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 187 (2012). 
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“application” “services.” Discrimination and blocking do not emerge as statistically 
relevant concepts in the texts by the FCC Notice or the operators. While this is not 
surprising in the case of the operator, the gap in the language for describing 
practices of concern between the FCC and the pro-neutrality camp appears much 
wider than between the FCC and the operators. The degree of semantic emphasis 
the FCC placed on reasonableness of concerning practices declined in the Order 
relative to the Notice. Nevertheless, the FCC Order retains the “reasonable network 
management” exception in constructing the rules that it plans to implement and 
enforce.44  
Economic and legal justifications: As noted above in the discussion of letters 
by lawmakers to the FCC in this matter, economic interests of consumers and the 
desire to have an open Internet are prominent in the semantics employed by those 
with contradictory positions about how the agency should proceed. A similar 
approach to justifying private interest policy positions in terms of what is good for 
the consumers can also be detected in our quantitative indicators of stakeholder 
semantics. Discussions relating to “consumers” appeared relatively more frequently 
in comments by the operators than the other stakeholders or the FCC. The high 
degree of emphasis on consumers by the operators is complemented with a 
relatively strong emphasis on “regulation” (25%), “competition” (35%), and 
“investment” (25%).45 Competition is a particularly prevalent concept in the 
semantics of the operators relative to both the FCC and submissions from the 
others.46  
The pro-neutrality comments focus more on the economic implications of 
                                                                                                             
 
44 The reasonable network management exception applies to all the rules outlined in the 
Order, except the prohibition on paid prioritization: “A network management practice is 
reasonable if it is primarily used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network 
management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology 
of the broadband Internet access service.” See supra note 5, para. 32. This construction 
provides significant discretion for operators to engage in discriminatory traffic management 
practices while justifying their actions as a technical necessity. It also provides the 
regulatory agency with significant discretion to determine what type of practices are 
reasonable, which can be a challenging task in complex and rapidly evolving broadband 
Internet access markets.  
45 These concepts represent the key elements of the traditional economic model 
employed in framing telecommunications policy debates in which policymakers try to 
balance competition and investment incentives of operators in order to maximize some 
measure of public interest and consumer welfare. For an review of the literature see 
Johannes M. Bauer, Regulation, Public Policy, and Investment in Communications 
Infrastructure, 34 TELECOMM. POL’Y 65 (2010). Given the high degree of structural 
dominance in telecommunications, the threat by operators to reduce their investments (if 
policymakers choose to adopt or not adopt particular regulations) might appear credible to 
policymakers and influence their decisions.  
46 A typical argument by operators is that there is sufficient competition and therefore 
regulation is unnecessary as unhappy customers can switch if they do not like the services 
they are receiving. In reality, monopolistic or duopolistic market structures in fixed Internet 
access are the norm (outside of some densely populated urban areas where installing 
multiple competing broadband network platforms can be economically justifiable). 
Furthermore, competition among service providers does not necessarily serve as a substitute 
to network neutrality regulation, and the impact of such rules on investment incentives of 
providers is ambiguous. See Joshua S. Gans, Weak Versus Strong Net Neutrality, 47 J. 
REGULATORY ECON. 183 (2015). 
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discrimination and blocking for the ability of consumers to access and use 
advanced Internet “content” (33%) and “applications” (20%) relative to either the 
FCC or the operators. Although both groups of stakeholders are signaling the 
importance of consumer interests, they appear to be looking at the economic 
problem at hand in very different terms. In contrast to both stakeholder groups, 
who frame economic justifications for their policy stance in terms of benefits for 
consumers, the FCC Notice placed significantly more emphasis on the concept of 
“edge” (42%) networks relative to consumers or users (at around 15% relevance 
each). While the Commission’s semantic emphasis on consumers and use remains 
broadly similar between the Notice and the Order, there is a substantial decline in 
emphasis on the implications of the regulations for so-called “edge” providers in 
the Order. The public consultation process appears to have helped direct the agency 
to justify its decision in terms of consumer protection, rather than as an attempt to 
solve commercial disputes among large content providers and dominant broadband 
network operators.47 The emphasis both groups of interveners placed on 
“innovation” was substantially higher than that of the FCC Notice or the Order, 
indicative of efforts by the opposing groups of stakeholders to convince the 
regulator to consider the implications of its policies on the future of the Internet as 
an innovation-generating platform.48 These efforts do not appear to have been 
especially successful in centralizing innovation in the conceptual model the agency 
employs to justify its final decision. Besides the usual economic justifications for 
public regulation common across the texts, “free” and “expression” emerge as 
relevant concepts in the FCC Order. This emerging element in the language of the 
regulator captures its attempt to introduce an additional legal justification for 
restricting the boundary of permissible conduct by gatekeepers of access to the 
Internet.49  
 
V. SUMMARY 
 
The ongoing debate about the role public policy can play in mitigating the costs 
of potentially anticompetitive traffic management practices by vertically integrated 
broadband operators provides an interesting basis to explore the utility of textual 
analytics technologies to evaluate the content of large bodies of relatively subtle 
legal and policy documents. The quantitative methodology adopted here provides a 
                                                                                                             
 
47 This interpretation of the semantic evidence is consistent with the text of the 2015 
Order to the extent that the Commission excludes interconnection from the scope of the 
Order. Supra note 5, para. 30. Nevertheless, the FCC retains some discretion to review 
disputes between edge providers and operators “where disputes are primarily over 
commercial terms and that involve some very large corporations, including companies like 
transit providers and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), that act on behalf of smaller edge 
providers.” Supra note 5, para. 193.  
48 For a discussion of challenges in balancing multiple policy objectives of stakeholders 
in the broadband ecosystem in the context of network neutrality debates see Johannes Bauer 
& Jonathan Obar, Reconciling Political and Economic Goals in the Net Neutrality Debate, 
30 THE INFO. SOC’Y 1 (2014). 
49 This interpretation of the semantic evidence is consistent with the decision by the 
Commission to justify adopting a “‘no unreasonable interference/disadvantage’” as an 
attempt to protect free expression, “thus fulfilling the Congressional policy that ‘the Internet 
offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.’” Supra note 5, para. 137.  
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relatively intuitive picture of technological, economic, and legal elements of 
debates about network neutrality regulation. Furthermore, by comparing the 
conceptual variety and intensity in texts by the FCC, operators, and other 
stakeholders, the article characterized how they tried to shape legal and policy 
choices in the FCC rulemaking process and how successful they were at doing so. 
The semantic evidence shows that in initiating this proceeding the FCC 
emphasized the importance of enhancing transparency of what it considers to be, 
more or less, reasonable traffic management practices by operators. The public 
consultation process provided the opportunity for millions of consumers and 
businesses that rely on Internet access to express their concerns about blocking, 
service quality differentiation, and bifurcation of the Internet into fast and slow 
lanes. Operators maintained that market competition will solve the problem while 
the adoption of new regulatory obligations by the FCC might force them to reduce 
their investment in network infrastructure.50  
In contrast, submissions from pro-neutrality interests signaled that binding 
prohibitions against certain blocking and discriminatory practices might be 
required for protecting and promoting an open Internet. These signals helped the 
Commission justify its decision to follow guidance from the courts in Verizon 
regarding the necessity of Title II reclassification and the legality of per se/bright 
line rules against vertical discrimination. Public input also highlighted growing 
reliance on mobile Internet access services, providing the Commission with a 
rationale to extend the scope of regulatory obligations to include both fixed and 
mobile network operators. While the FCC appears to have incorporated signals 
from stakeholders regarding the importance of its choices about Title II 
reclassification, scope of open access rules, and the pitfalls of paid prioritization, 
the rule-of-reason approach to substantive interpretation and special services 
exceptions limit the capacity of the new regulatory framework to constrain 
anticompetitive traffic management practices of dominant network operators.51  
Beyond the case of rulemaking for an open Internet in the U.S., the quantitative 
linguistic methodology used here highlights that content extraction and text 
analytics technologies can be valuable for reducing complex and subtle legal 
documents into their essential elements in an automated and relatively unbiased 
                                                                                                             
 
50 It is precisely this argument that makes it doubtful that rules adopted under Section 706 
authority (versus Title II authority) would withstand future litigation by the operators. 
Section 706(a)’s mandate is very narrow and authorizes only policies intended to “remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment.” See 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2015).  
51 This view of the design of the new regulatory framework helps explain why the 
adoption of the FCC Order does not appear to have had an impact on the share price of large 
operators such as Comcast and Verizon, or content and application delivery companies such 
as Google, Amazon, and Akamai. Financial market signals confirm the hypothesis that the 
new rules were not designed to alter status quo institutional arrangements and essentially 
function to legitimize various forms of traffic management practices consumers and 
emerging competitors consider anticompetitive. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
FCC decision occurred before a substantive decline in the share prices of some operators 
such as AT&T and content providers such as Netflix. See generally YAHOO FINANCE,  
http://finance.yahoo.com/ (share price data). While it is not easy to decompose long- and 
short-term trends in equity prices, distinct effects of the FCC rules on the valuations of 
different types of firms in the broadband ecosystem represents an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
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manner. Although expert human supervision and future advances in NLP 
technologies remain imperative, automation has the potential to significantly 
reduce the costs of “understanding” what individuals and groups of participants in 
large multi-stakeholder processes are trying to convey to policymakers charged 
with serving the public interest. For parties involved in such processes, these 
technologies can be employed to monitor the position of other parties, identify 
potential opponents and allies, and adjust their own strategies accordingly. In their 
capacity to reduce the costs of participation, adoption of such technologies would 
be particularly relevant for organizations and interests with relatively limited 
resources to effectively engage in rulemaking contests against large and resourceful 
opponents seeking policies that serve their private interests. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 2. Comparative Semantics of Network Neutrality 
 
FCC	  Notice	   Operators	   Others	   FCC	  Order	  
providers	   1	   providers	   1	   broadband	   0.8	   service	   1	  
broadband	   0.95	   broadband	   0.97	   access	   0.75	   broadband	   0.96	  
rules	   0.52	   service	   0.87	   open	   0.59	   access	   0.82	  
edge	   0.42	   access	   0.53	   service	   0.56	   provider	   0.43	  
services	   0.35	   network	   0.5	   providers	   0.54	   rule	   0.23	  
open	   0.34	   consumers	   0.49	   network	   0.53	   open	   0.2	  
comment	   0.31	   offer	   0.36	   services	   0.51	   network	   0.17	  
access	   0.29	   competition	   0.34	   mobile	   0.48	   use	   0.13	  
Rule	   0.29	   rules	   0.34	   rules	   0.46	   consumer	   0.12	  
network	   0.21	   available	   0.27	   consumers	   0.39	   mobile	   0.11	  
commercially	   0.19	   investment	   0.26	   content	   0.33	   information	   0.1	  
reasonable	   0.18	   regulation	   0.26	   fixed	   0.31	   practices	   0.09	  
proposed	   0.18	   use	   0.23	   networks	   0.26	   Telecommun-­‐	  
ications	  
0.09	  
practices	   0.17	   information	   0.22	   available	   0.24	   public	   0.08	  
transparency	   0.15	   wireless	   0.22	   data	   0.23	   content	   0.08	  
consumer	   0.14	   users	   0.22	   authority	   0.22	   reasonable	   0.08	  
adopted	   0.13	   speeds	   0.21	   use	   0.22	   provisions	   0.08	  
users	   0.13	   innovation	   0.21	   protections	   0.22	   edge	   0.07	  
management	   0.12	   content	   0.2	   public	   0.22	   regulation	   0.07	  
information	   0.11	   customers	   0.2	   applications	   0.21	   forbearance	   0.07	  
Data	   0.11	   approach	   0.2	   users	   0.2	   standard	   0.06	  
approach	   0.11	   open	   0.19	   reasonable	   0.19	   user	   0.06	  
content	   0.09	   arrangements	   0.19	   rule	   0.19	   data	   0.06	  
level	   0.08	   traffic	   0.19	   consumer	   0.19	   carrier	   0.06	  
applications	   0.08	   edge	   0.18	   neutrality	   0.19	   record	   0.06	  
common	   0.08	   mobile	   0.18	   blocking	   0.18	   business	   0.06	  
mobile	   0.08	   applications	   0.17	   practices	   0.18	   traffic	   0.06	  
market	   0.08	   including	   0.16	   regulatory	   0.18	   investment	   0.06	  
licenses	   0.07	   data	   0.16	   information	   0.17	   management	   0.06	  
specific	   0.07	   practices	   0.14	   common	   0.17	   parties	   0.06	  
public	   0.07	   Telecommun-­‐	  
ications	  
0.14	   discrimination	   0.15	   decision	   0.05	  
traffic	   0.07	   market	   0.13	   innovation	   0.15	   transmission	   0.05	  
subject	   0.06	   regulatory	   0.13	   market	   0.15	   authority	   0.05	  
legal	   0.06	   devices	   0.12	   prioritization	   0.15	   interconnection	   0.05	  
court	   0.06	   wireline	   0.12	   competition	   0.15	   common	   0.05	  
different	   0.06	   policy	   0.12	   video	   0.14	   definition	   0.05	  
ability	   0.06	   percent	   0.11	   traffic	   0.14	   market	   0.05	  
competition	   0.06	   prioritization	   0.11	   wireless	   0.13	   expression	   0.04	  
Best	   0.06	   industry	   0.11	   regulation	   0.12	   prioritization	   0.04	  
fixed	   0.05	   significant	   0.1	   carriers	   0.12	   competition	   0.04	  
parties	   0.05	   transmission	   0.1	   devices	   0.12	   paid	   0.04	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Table 2 continued 
	  
FCC	  Notice	   Operators	   Others	   FCC	  Order	  
Telecommun-­‐	  
ications	  
0.04	   common	   0.1	   ability	   0.12	   conduct	   0.04	  
available	   0.04	   reclassification	   0.1	   companies	   0.12	   block	   0.04	  
certain	   0.04	   marketplace	   0.09	   likely	   0.11	   fixed	   0.03	  
investment	   0.04	   public	   0.09	   time	   0.11	   costs	   0.03	  
video	   0.03	   paid	   0.09	   costs	   0.11	   free	   0.03	  
deployment	   0.03	   standard	   0.09	   policy	   0.11	   cable	   0.03	  
innovate	   0.03	   video	   0.07	   digital	   0.09	   wireless	   0.03	  
authority	   0.03	   neutrality	   0.05	   decision	   0.09	   necessary	   0.02	  
cable	   0.02	   net	   0.05	   cable	   0.08	   video	   0.01	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sample of Formal Comments by the Stakeholders to the FCC 
 
Organization	   Abbreviation	  
AT	  &	  T	  Services	   Att	  
Consumer	  Federation	  of	  America	   Cfa	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce	   Chamcom	  
Comcast	  Corporation	   Comcas	  
Consumers	  Union	   consU	  
Telecommunications	  for	  the	  Dear	  and	  Hard	  of	  Hearing	  et	  al.	   Deafam	  
Electronic	  Frontier	  Foundation	   Efrontf	  
Internet	  Association	  	   Intass	  
Open	  Media	  and	  Information	  Companies	  Initiative	   Invstmic	  
Media	  Alliance	   Mediaalliance	  
Minority	  Media	   Minmedia	  
Netflix	  Inc.	   Netflix	  
New	  America	  Foundation	   Newamf	  
NTCA-­‐The	  Rural	  Broadband	  Association	   Ntcarural	  
Verizon	  and	  Verizon	  Wireless	   Verizon	  
